Brigham Young University Law School

BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Court of Appeals Briefs

2010

Randy L. Robinson v. Alexander Earl Baggett :
Reply Brief
Utah Court of Appeals

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca3
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief Submitted to the Utah Court of Appeals; digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law
Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University, Provo, Utah; machine-generated
OCR, may contain errors.
Frederick N. Green; Attorney for Appellee.
Michael K. Mohrman; Tracy C. Schofield; Mitchell S. Maio; Mohrman & Schofield; Attorney for
Appellant.
Recommended Citation
Reply Brief, Robinson v. Baggett, No. 20100197 (Utah Court of Appeals, 2010).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca3/2215

This Reply Brief is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Court of Appeals
Briefs by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. Policies regarding these Utah briefs are available at
http://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/utah_court_briefs/policies.html. Please contact the Repository Manager at hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu with
questions or feedback.

IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
Randy L. Robinson,
Petitioner/Appellee,
Appeal No. 20100197-CA
Alexander Earl Baggett,
Respondent/Appellant.
REPLY BRIEF OF APPELLANT
Appealfroman order entered in the District Court for the Third Judicial District,
in and for Salt Lake County, State of Utah, the Honorable Stephen L. Roth,
Robert P. Faust, and Paul G. Maughan presiding.

Frederick N. Green, Esq.
7390 South Creek Rd.5 Ste. 104
Sandy, Utah 84093

Michael K. Mohrman [4094]
Tracy C. Schofield [11764]
Mitchell S.Maio [11711]
Mohrman & Schofield PC
175 S. Main St., Suite 900
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Telephone: (801) 746-2268
Facsimile: (801) 746-2411

Attorney for Appellee

Attorneys for Appellant

ORAL ARGUMENT REQUESTED
-rr—
RtED
UTAH APPELLATE COURTS

J A N - 4 2011

•v IHE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
Randy L. Robinson,
Petitioner/Appellee,
Appeal No. 20100197-CA
A lexander Earl i iavsett.

REPLY BRIEF OF APPELLANT
Appeal from an order entered in the District (. ourt for the 'i r.r i -iuliCidi District
in and for Salt Lake County, State of Utah, the Honorable S'ephen L. Roth,
Robert P. Faust, an 11'uul G. Maughan presiding.

A

Frederick N. Green, Esc
7390 South Creek Rd N
Sandy, Utah 84093
Attorney for Appellee

104

- '"diacl K. Mohrman [4094j
: ;oyC Schoileld [117641
Mitchell S.Maio [11711J
Mohrman & Schofteld p r
175 S. Main St., Suite yuu
Salt I ake City, Utah 84111
Telephone: (801) 746-2268
Facsimile: (801)746-2411
•.ppt'JCltlT

ORAL ARGUMENT REQUESTED

TABLE OF CONTENTS
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

ii

ARGUMENT

1

I. Because Several Legitimate Issues Remain in Dispute This Court Lacks Subject
Matter Jurisdiction Over This Appeal and Must Dismiss It
1
II. The Trial Court Abused Its Discretion by Denying Baggett's Motion for Rule
60 Relief From Judgment Or Order Without Considering All the Relevant Facts and
Circumstances
7
CONCLUSION

13

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
Cases
Bowen v. Bowen. 2010 UT App 274U (mem.) (per curiam)
Bradbury v. Valencia. 2000 UT 50, 5 P.3d 649
Jones v. Lavton/Okland. 2009 UT 39,214 P.3d 859
Kunzlerv.O'Dell. 855 P.2d 270 (Utah Ct. App. 1993)
Laub v. South Cent. Utah Tel. Ass'n, 657 P.2d 1304 (Utah 1982)
Varian-Eimac. Inc. v. Lamoreaux. 767 P.2d 569 (Utah Ct. App. 1989)
Rules
Utah R. App. P. 3(a)
Utah R. Civ. P. 60(b)

5, 6
1, 3, 4, 6
7, 13
11
7,11
7
1, 3
3,11

ii

IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
Randy L. Robinson,
Petitioner/Appellee,
AppealNo.20100197~CA

v.
Alexander Earl Baggett,
Respondent/Appellant.

REPLY BRIEF OF APPELLANT

ARGUMENT
I. Because Several Legitimate Issues Remain in Dispute This Court Lacks
Subject Matter Jurisdiction Over This Appeal and Must Dismiss It
The parties agree that a trial court's ruling must "end[] the controversy between
the parties litigant" in order for this court to have jurisdiction over an appeal taken from
that ruling. Bradbury v. Valencia, 2000 UT 50, Tf 9, 5 P.3d 649 (internal quotation marks
omitted); see id % 10; Utah R. App. P. 3(a). The parties disagree, however, as to whether
the trial court has entered such a ruling in this case. The record is clear that in April 2008
the trial court, through the Honorable Robert P. Faust, entered the unopposed Amended
Supplemental Decree of Divorce (April 2008 order), which entry represented Judge
Faust's first involvement in this lengthy and complicated litigation. See R. 1322-35.
Only a few months later, after receiving full briefing from the parties regarding the
deficiencies in the April 2008 order, Judge Faust found the deficiencies sufficient to
l

warrant a hearing. At the hearing, held in October 2008, Judge Faust stated his belief that
(1) the April 2008 order was not "completely consistent with what Judge Roth had
[ruled]59 and (2) there were several "legitimate" issues that the April 2008 order had left
unresolved and upon which the court still needed to rule. See R. 1923, pgs. 5,6,11.
Robinson's counsel conceded that the remaining issues "probably ought to all be heard"
and agreed to negotiate with Raggett's counsel to attempt to resolve these issues before
the court ruled upon them. See id. at 10. The straightforward question before this court
is the following: Did the April 2008 order end the controversy between the parties by
finally resolving all issues in this litigation where the trial judge and both parties
subsequently recognized that several issues still need to be resolved by the court? The
simple answer is no.
As Judge Faust stated at the October 2008 hearing, his review of the relevant
briefing had convinced him that
there appears to be ... one or two issues where it really does need
perhaps some additional clarification. So I can't say legitimately every
single issue that you guys can't agree between yourselves needs Court
assistance, but there does appear to be some. And ... the one that stuck
out in my mind ... was life insurance.
Id. at 6. Judge Faust also noted that the alimony commencement date remained
unresolved, stating his belief that the parties "really ought to be able to figure out what
the starting date is for the 102 month[]" alimony award. Id. at 8-9. Robinson's counsel
agreed with Judge Faust's assessment, noting that in addition to "the alimony issue
duration and commencement date ... the Court has at least acknowledged that... [the]
2

life insurance issue .., [is] a bona fide issue." Id. at 11. With nothing more, these
comments make clear that the April 2008 order is not a final, appealable order because
bona fide issues remain to be resolved by the trial court. See Bradbury, 2000 UT 50, ^j 9.
Consequently, this court lacks subject matter jurisdiction over Baggett's appeal. See
Utah R. App, P. 3(a).
Robinson implicitly agrees that the April 2008 order is not a final order, arguing
that the final, appealable order in this case is actually the Honorable Paul G. Maughan's
denial of Baggett's Motion for Rule 60(b) Relief From Judgment or Order (rule 60(b)
motion) by Minute Entry in February 2010.1 See Brief of Appellee, pgs. 16-18 ("This
Court Has Subject Matter Jurisdiction Over This Appeal Because the Trial ( oni 11 las
Entered a Final Order Denying the Second Rule 60 Motion."). However, because the
April 2008 order is not a final order, Baggett's rule 60(b) motion was not properly before
Judge Maughan. See Utah R. Civ. P. 60(b) (stating that rule 60(b) relief is available only
to "relieve a party or his legal representative from afinaljudgment, order, or proceeding"
(emphasis added)). Even assuming that Baggett's rule 60(b) motion was properly before
Judge Maughan, the Minute Entry purporting to deny that motion cannot constitute a
final order because it did not contain a ruling on any of the issues Judge Faust identified
as still in dispute, nor even acknowledge that Judge Faust held a hearing on Baggett's
rule 60(b) motion. See K. I *> 14 • 17 To he clear, the trial court has still not made the

1

For a more detailed explanation as to the procedural history of Baggett's two post-trial
motions for relief, see Brief of Appellant pgs. 9-1L
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rulings that the court and both parties recognized as necessary to bring finality to this
case. Because the Minute Entry purporting to deny Baggett's rule 60(b) motion did not
rule on the previously identified and still-disputed issues in this case, it too failed to
;t

end[] the controversy between the parties litiganf' and is therefore not a final,

appealable order. See Bradbury, 2000 UT 50, If 9.
In the alternative, Robinson now seems to imply, contrary to her position at the
October 2008 hearing, that there are no longer any "bona fide issue[s]" to be resolved
and, accordingly, that the April 2008 order is a final order. See R. 1923, pg. 11. In
support, she notes that Judge Faust did not explicitly state that he was reopening the April
2008 order or that he was granting Baggett's rule 60(b) motion. Brief of Appellee, pg.
17. Although Robinson is correct that Judge Faust said neither of these things, she fails
to acknowledge that he did say the following: (1) there are legitimate issues still to be
resolved; (2) the April 2008 order as entered does not conform to Judge Roth's
substantive rulings; (3) if he did grant Baggett's rule 60(b) motion he would rule
immediately upon the disputed issues unless the parties desired one last chance to
negotiate the final decree; and (4) he needed and intended to rule upon any issues the
parties were unable to resolve through negotiation. See generally R. 1923* Also
noticeably absent from Robinson's appellate brief is her counsel's subsequent agreement
to negotiate resolution of the still-disputed issues with Baggett's counsel and his
suggestion that, after the parties had negotiated, the court hold "a telephone conference
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... to see what is still on the table, if anything, and then ... resolve any issues, if any, that
survive." R. 1923 at 13 (emphasis added).
Robinson concedes that for the fifteen (15) months immediately following the
October 2008 hearing she "attempted to negotiate in good faith with Baggett to resolve
his objections to the [April 2008 order]." Brief of Appellee, pg. 14. Incredibly, she
suggests that this lengthy negotiation was nothing more than a gesture made "[i]n a spirit
of cooperation," Id. at 13. Collegiality aside, it is difficult to imagine why Robinson
would negotiate the final terms of the parties' divorce in good faith for more than a year
after securing what she now attests to be an iron-cladfinaljudgment, especially
considering that this judgment came after six (6) years of very contentious litigation.
Regardless of Robinson's motivation, in order to find that subject matter jurisdiction is
proper this court would have to believe not only that Judge Faust and Robinson were
each mistaken in identifying legitimate issues that remained in dispute, but also that
Robinson negotiated in good faith for more than a year to resolve issues that had already
been finally resolved. This is illogical at best.
Finally, a brief examination of a recent case decided by the court of appeals
confirms that this court lacks subject matter jurisdiction over Baggett's appeal. In Bowen
v. Bowen, 2010 UT App 274U (mem.) (per curiam), this court reaffirmed that it lacks
subject matter jurisdiction over a case in which further action is contemplated in the
district court, even if the parties mistakenly believe that a final order has been entered. In
Bowen, the trial court granted the plaintiffs motion for summary judgment but left it to
5

the parties to try to agree on the appointment of a successor trustee and the reasonable
sum of money that the defendant wrongfully received, further stating that the parties were
to submit to the court for a ruling on these issues if they were unable to agree. See id.
para. 3. The plaintiff filed a notice of appeal following entry of this summary judgment
but before the trial court had made the anticipated additional rulings. See id. paras. 1, 56. Upon concluding that "[t]he summary judgment entered ... is not final and appealable
because it directed the parties to take further action" and expressly contemplated
additional rulings to be made by the trial court, the Bowen court dismissed the
defendant's appeal without prejudice to the timely filing of an appeal following the entry
of an order resolving the outstanding issues identified by the trial court. See id. paras. 5,
7. As in Bowen, the April 2008 order is not final and appealable because the trial court
directed the parties to negotiate resolution of the outstanding issues and expressly
contemplated that the court would make additional rulings if the parties were unable to
agree thereon. As the briefing and record make clear, the parties have not reached
agreement on the still-disputed issues and the court has not entered the necessary and
anticipated additional rulings to otherwise resolve them.
In sum, because the trial court has at no point entered a final order that ends the
controversy between the parties by "finally disposing] of the subject-matter of the
litigation on the merits of the case," this court lacks jurisdiction over Baggett's appeal.
See Bradbury v. Valencia, 2000 UT 50, % 9, 5 P.3d 649 (internal quotation marks
omitted). And once this court determines that "a matter is outside [its] jurisdiction it
6

retains only the authority to dismiss the action." Varian-Eimac, Inc. v. Lamoreaux, 767
P.2d 569, 570 (Utah Ct. App. 1989). Accordingly, this court must dismiss Baggett's
appeal without prejudice to the timely filing of a notice of appeal following the entry of a
final and appealable order by the trial court.
II. The Trial Court Abused Its Discretion by Denying Baggett's Motion for Rule
60 Relief From Judgment Or Order Without Considering All the Relevant
Facts and Circumstances.
In the event this court determines that it has jurisdiction over this appeal, it should
nevertheless reverse the trial court's denial of Baggett's rule 60(b) motion as an abuse of
discretion because the denial is "against the logic of the circumstances and so arbitrary
and unreasonable as to shock one's sense of justice." See Jones v. Lavton/Okland, 2009
UT 39, U 27, 214 P.3d 859 (internal quotation marks omitted). When deciding whether to
grant or deny a motion for rule 60(b) relief, a trial court must exercise its allotted
discretion "based on sound legal principles in light of all relevant circumstances." Laub
v. South Cent. Utah Tel. Ass'n. 657 P.2d 1304,1306 (Utah 1982). In making its
decision, the trial court must also focus on balancing the competing "concerns that final
judgments should not be lightly disturbed and that unjust judgments should not be
allowed to stand." Id In denying Baggett's rule 60(b) motion Judge Maughan failed to
consider all the relevant facts and circumstances, most notably including Judge Faust's
determination that some of the substantive issues raised in Baggett's rule 60(b) motion
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are "legitimate" and call for resolution by the court.2 As a result of this failure, Judge
Maughan also necessarily failed to balance the tenuous finality of the April 2008 order
with the remarkably unjust alimony award contained therein. Together, these failures
lead to the inevitable conclusion that the trial court abused its discretion in denying
Raggett's rule 60(b) motion.
As stated above, after thoroughly reviewing each party's briefing relevant to
Baggett's rule 60(b) motion, Judge Faust determined that the April 2008 order had not
finally resolved all litigation issues in this case and that, of necessity, the court still
needed to rule on several substantive issues. See R. 1923, pg. 6. Judge Faust then
agreed, at the suggestion of Robinson's counsel, to defer ruling on these issues until the
parties had attempted one last time to resolve the disputes without court intervention. See
id. at 10,13. Judge Faust further stated that if the parties were unable to resolve these
issues on their own then either he or the Honorable Stephen L. Roth would hold a hearing
to rule on them. See id. After approximately one year of negotiation, the partiesfileda
joint motion to have Judge Roth reassigned to this case so that he could rule on the
disputed issues and finally resolve this matter. See R. 1901-03. For reasons that are
unclear from the record, the parties agreed to the denial of their joint motion to reassign
Judge Roth after consultation with the presiding judge of the Third District Court. See R.
1904-06. Following this, and per the court's instruction, Baggett filed a Request to

2

As noted in Baggett's Brief of Appellant, the individual judges are referred to by name
solely for the sake of clarity. See Brief of Appellant, pg. 20 n.8.
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Submit for Decision (Hearing Requested) for the purpose of finally resolving the disputed
issues. See R. 1911-13. It was at this point that Judge Maughan was first assigned to this
case.
Just ten (10) days later Judge Maughan issued a Minute Entry denying Baggett's
rule 60(b) motion without holding the hearing contemplated by Judge Faust or ruling on
any of the disputed issues identified by Judge Faust. See R. 1914-17. The primary
substantive reason for this denial is that Judge Maughan was "not persuaded" that the
April 2008 order "does not accurately reflect Judge Roth's extensive rulings.'5 R. 1915,
As support for this determination, Judge Maughan noted his belief that "this conclusion
comports with Judge Faust's Minute Entry which similarly found a lack of legal or
factual support for [Baggett]'s initial Rule [59 or] 60(b) Motion [(rule 59 motion)]."3 Id.
n.l (emphasis omitted). Although this may be an accurate summation of Judge Faust's
assessment of Baggett's rule 59 motion, it is an incorrect statement of Judge Faust's
subsequent determination with respect to Baggett's rule 60(b) motion. In fact, Judge
Faust stated, after considering Baggett's rule 60(b) motion, that he believed the April
2008 order was not "completely consistent with what Judge Roth had [ruled]." R. 1923,
pg. 5. Thus, contrary to Judge Maughan's assertion, Judge Faust not only found
Baggett's rule 60(b) motion factually and legally sufficient to warrant a hearing, but also
determined at that hearing that several issues raised in Baggett's rule 60(b) motion are
"legitimate" and need to be resolved by the court.
3

See supra note 1.
9

In any event, Judge Roth's decision to hold a hearing on Baggett's rule 60(b)
motion and his statements and rulings made at that hearing are relevant facts and
circumstances that must have been considered in order for the trial court to have properly
evaluated Baggetf s rule 60(b) motion. Also unquestionably relevant are the following:
(1) Robinson's counsel's agreement that legitimate issues remained in dispute and his
related agreements to negotiate resolution of these issues with Baggetf s counsel and to
seek court assistance if the negotiations proved unsuccessful; (2) Robinson's subsequent
negotiation with Baggett for more than a year to resolve these disputed issues; and (3) the
parties filing of a joint motion to have Judge Roth reassigned to resolve the outstanding
issues in this case. However, Judge Maughan's Minute Entry makes no mention
whatsoever of any of these facts and circumstances. The likely reason for this omission
is because Judge Maughan "rule[d] on [Baggett's rule 60(b)] Motion based [solely] on
the parties' written submissions/5 R. 1914, which were necessarily submitted prior to the
October 2008 hearing to resolve the motion. Put another way, nothing in either of the
party's rule 60(b) briefing would have alerted Judge Maughan to the existence of or
rulings made at the October 2008 hearing, for the obvious reason that that hearing had not
yet occurred when the briefs were submitted. Regardless, the absence of any evidence
that these essential and relevant facts were considered, together with Judge Maughan's
misplaced reliance on Judge Faust's ruling denying Baggett's rule 59 motion and his
omission of Judge Fausf s later ruling implicitly granting Baggett's rule 60(b) motion,
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demonstrate that the trial court abused its discretion by failing to make its determination
"in light of all relevant circumstances." See Laub, 657 P.2d at 1306.
In addition, Baggett's entitlement to rule 60(b) relief from the alimony award in
the April 2008 order is clear. Pertinent to this appeal, a party may be relieved from a
final judgment or order for the following two reasons: (1) "fraud ..., misrepresentation
or other misconduct of an adverse party," see Utah R. Civ. P. 60(b)(3); or (2) "any other
reason justifying relief from the operation of the judgment," such as a clerical error made
in memorializing thefinaljudgment, see id. R. 60(b)(6); Kunzler v. O'Dell 855 P.2d
270, 274-75 (Utah Ct. App. 1993) (applying rule 60(b)(6) to provide relief from and
correction of a clerical error in thefinaljudgment). The record demonstrates that Baggett
should be relieved from the April 2008 order because the alimony award contained
therein is significantly and inexplicably different than the actual, intended alimony award
as announced by the court in its January 2006 Memorandum Decision and reaffirmed on
several occasions.
It is undisputed that the trial court awarded Robinson alimony "for a period equal
to the length of the [parties'] marriage," or 114 months—from December 1995 through
June 2005. R, 943. It is also undisputed that the trial court credited Baggett with his
payment of one year of temporary alimony during the pendency of the divorce, such that
his 114 month alimony obligation should begin in June 2004. See idL Despite these clear
and unequivocal rulings, Robinson repeatedly attempted to increase her alimony award
based on nothing more than "her fundamental concern that we have picked up [Baggett's
li

fault] to the Court's satisfaction/' R. 1924, pg. 42; see R. 957,1062. The court
expressly rejected these various attempts, stating that it had purposely "limited the effects
of [fault] to [the issues of equitable allocation of marital assets and unsecured debt], and
... made a conscious decision" not to incorporate fault into the alimony ruling. R. 1924,
pgs. 42-43. Undeterred, Robinson ultimately submitted to the court an order awarding
herself alimony for nearly three (3) years, or 30%, longer than the term of the parties5
marriage. Robinson based this windfall of approximately $70,000 on Baggett's fault
alone. See R. 1702 (stating simply that "the Court f[ou]nd[] extensive dissipation of
the marital estate by [Baggett]")- Baggett's failure to timely object resulted in the entry
of this unopposed order in April 2008 by a newly-assigned judge who did not make the
underlying alimony award. The only possible explanations for this excessive alimony
award are either that Robinson misrepresented the alimony award to the court or there
was a clerical error in entering the alimony award. Under either explanation, Baggett is
entitled to relief from the April 2008 order and correction of the alimony award to
conform to the trial court's actual, intended ruling such that Robinson receives alimony
for a period of 114 months beginning in June 2004.
In sum, the unjustified 30% extension in Robinson's alimony award, together with
Judge Maughan's failure to consider all the relevant facts and circumstances, make it
clear that the denial of Baggett's rule 60(b) motion is "against the logic of the
circumstances and so arbitrary and unreasonable as to shock one's sense of justice." See
Jones v. Lavton/Okland, 2009 UT 39,1f 27,214 P.3d 859 (internal quotation marks
12

omitted). Accordingly, this court should reverse the trial court's denial of Baggett's rule
60(b) motion and grant Baggett his requested relief from the alimony award in the April
2008 order.

CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, Baggett respectfully requests that this court dismiss his
appeal without prejudice to the timely filing of a notice of appeal following entry of a
final judgment or order in this matter. In the alternative, Baggett respectfully requests
that this court reverse the trial court's denial of his Motion for Rule 60 Relief from
Judgment or Order as an abuse of the trial court's discretion, and either enter an alimony
award for 114 months beginning in June 2004 or remand to the trial court for such other
proceedings as are necessary for the trial court to enter an alimony award that is
consistent with its substantive alimony rulings.
Dated this 4th day of January, 2011.
Mohrman & Schofield PC

Michael K. Mohrman
Tracy C. Schofield
Mitchell S. Maio
Attorneys for Appellant
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